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West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022).
Amanda R. Spear*
The EPA created the Clean Power Plan in an effort to reduce the
amount of greenhouse gas emissions generated by coal-fired power plants.
The EPA determined that the Best System of Emission Reduction for existing coal-fired power plants included generation shifting methods, meaning a shift from coal to cleaner sources. The Supreme Court held, under
the major questions doctrine, that Congress had not intended for the EPA
to use generation shifting methods for the Best System of Emission Reduction and that the EPA had exceeded its authority in doing so. This note
will explore how the decision may impact administrative law with the official introduction of the major questions doctrine, as well as the potential
environmental impacts.
I. INTRODUCTION
The question presented is whether the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) acted within its congressionally delegated authority
when it determined power generation shifting methods were an appropriate Best System of Emission Reduction (“BSER”), as opposed to solely
technological and procedural controls.1 To regulate carbon dioxide emissions from existing coal-fired power plants, the EPA, under Section 111(d)
of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), proposed the Clean Power Plan (“CPP”).2
Under the CPP, the EPA determined that the BSER for existing coal-fired
power plants involved both heat rate improvements and generation shifting methods.3 Generation shifting methods would result in change at the
grid level, rather than change at the individual plant level.4
Before the CPP went into effect, the EPA, under the Trump administration, repealed the CPP and replaced it with the Affordable Clean
Energy (“ACE”) rule. Unlike the CPP, the ACE rule used only heat rate
improvement measures for the BSER.5 The D.C. Circuit Court later vacated the ACE rule, in turn vacating the repeal of the CPP, and held that
the EPA had the authority to use generation shifting methods for the
BSER.6
Unhappy with the Circuit Court decision, multiple states, coal corporations, and mining corporations petitioned for review of the CPP.7 The
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1.
West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2600 (2022).
2.
Id. at 2602.
3.
Id. at 2603.
4.
Id. at 2604–05.
5.
Id. at 2605.
6.
Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 985 F.3d 914, 995 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
7.
West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2600.
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Supreme Court granted certiorari.8 The Court held, in an opinion written
by Chief Justice Roberts, that the question of whether the EPA could include generation shifting methods in the BSER for existing coal-fired
power plants fell under the major questions doctrine.9 More specifically,
the Court stated that if Congress had intended to give EPA this authority,
it would have made that clear and would not have intended for that authority to be implied through a gap-filler provision like Section 111(d).10 The
Court, reversing the Circuit Court’s decision, held that the EPA did not
have the authority to consider generation shifting methods and remanded
the case for further proceedings.11
The Dissent, written by Justice Kagan, argued that Section 111(d)
is intended as a catch-all provision to regulate pollutants that do not fall
under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) or the
Hazardous Air Pollutants (“HAP”) programs.12 The Dissent reasoned that
Congress used the language it did in Section 111 to provide the EPA with
discretion and flexibility and that under that section, Congress gave the
EPA the authority to use generation shifting methods when determining
the BSER for existing coal-fired power plants.13 The Dissent concluded by
stating either Congress or the agency should be the decision maker on climate policy, not the Court.14
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The central issue is whether the EPA had the authority to determine that generation shifting was an appropriate BSER for existing coalfired power plants.15 This issue is based on the EPA’s authority under the
CAA.16 Courts typically apply Chevron17 deference when an agency is interpreting an ambiguous statute.18 Here, the Court used the major questions doctrine to determine the breadth of EPA’s authority.19

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
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18.
19.

Id. at 2606.
Id. at 2610.
Id. at 2608.
Id. at 2616.
Id. at 2629 (Kagan, J., with Breyer and Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2644
Id. at 2600 (majority opinion).
Id.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 843.
West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2609–10.
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A. Clean Air Act
The CAA was a landmark environmental law passed in 1970.20
One of the primary goals of the CAA is to encourage and promote government action that focuses on pollution prevention.21 The EPA administers
the CAA, as designated by Congress.22 There are three main regulatory
programs created and enforced by the EPA that are used to control air pollution produced by mobile and stationary sources.23 First, NAAQS focus
on pollutants that are harmful to public health and are commonly produced
by multiple stationary and mobile sources.24 Second, the HAP program
addresses toxic pollutants that NAAQS does not cover.25 Third, the New
Source Performance Standards Program, known as Section 111, guides
performance standards for categories of stationary sources that produce air
pollutants that “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare.”26
Under Section 111, the EPA must determine the performance
standard on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis for each source category.27 Performance standard is defined as the emission standard that reflects the
emission limitation possible when applying the BSER to the source.28 Section 111 focuses on new and existing sources.29 Once the EPA has set a
standard for a pollutant from a new source, the EPA, under Section 111(d),
must then determine the standard for existing sources in the same source
category for any pollutant not already covered under NAAQS or HAP.30
When Section 111 was enacted, the EPA Administrator created a list of
stationary sources that would be regulated under Section 111; fossil-fuelfired steam generating power plants were included on the list.31
When evaluating pollutants under Section 111, the EPA must first
determine the appropriate BSER, considering costs and impacts on health,
the environment, and energy requirements. 32 Second, the agency must
then determine the “degree of emissions limitation achievable through the

20.
Clean Air Act Overview, Evolution of the Clean Air Act, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Dec. 7, 2021), https://perma.cc/RYR4-PGE3 (last visited Oct. 28, 2021).
21.
42 U.S.C. § 7401(c) (2018).
22.
Id. § 7602(a).
23.
West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2600.
24.
42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (2018).
25.
Id. § 7412.
26.
Id. § 7411(b)(1)(A).
27.
Id. § 7411.
28.
Id. § 7411(a)(1).
29.
West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2601 (2022).
30.
Id.
31.
Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 985 F.3d 914, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
32.
42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
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application” of the BSER and determine the appropriate standards of performance for the specific source category.33 The states are tasked with implementing and enforcing the standards of performance.34
B. Clean Power Plan
In 2007, the Court held that greenhouse gases fit the broad definition of an air pollutant under the CAA.35 This decision required the EPA
to regulate greenhouse gases as pollutants.36 The EPA could avoid the regulation in one of two ways.37 First, by showing greenhouse gases did not
contribute to climate change, or second, by showing there was another reasonable explanation for not regulating greenhouse gases.38 The EPA later
determined that fossil-fuel-fired electricity generating units produce almost one-third of the greenhouse gases produced in the United States.39
To reduce greenhouse gas production in the United States, the
EPA sought to regulate emissions of greenhouse gas under Section 111 by
regulating coal-fired power plans.40 In 2015, the EPA promulgated a rule
under Section 111 regulating carbon dioxide emission from new, modified,
and reconstructed fossil-fuel-fired electric utility generating units.41 This
promulgation triggered the creation of the CPP, a plan establishing standards of performance to be used in the regulation of carbon dioxide emissions from existing coal-fired power plants.42 Like all standards of performance determined under Section 111, the EPA first had to determine the
BSER for existing coal-fired power plants, and then determine the appropriate standard of performance through the implementation of the BSER.43
Under the CPP, the EPA determined that the BSER for existing
coal-fired power plants consisted of three “building blocks,” or emission

33.
Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New,
Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80
Fed. Reg. 64,509, 64,512 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 60, 70, 71, et.
al.).
34.
42 U.S.C. § 7411(c)(1).
35.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
36.
Id. at 31–33.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Fron New,
Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80
Fed. Reg. at 64,530.
40.
Id. at 64,511.
41.
Id.
42.
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,663
(Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
43.
42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
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reduction measures, that would be used to determine the appropriate performance standards.44 The first building block involved heat rate improvements, which are technologies used to improve a plant's efficiency.45 The
second and third blocks focused on generation shifting, meaning shifting
the way the electricity is generated from dirtier to cleaner sources.46 The
first generation shifting block was a shift from coal-fired plants to naturalgas-fired plants. In contrast, the second generation shifting block shifted
from coal and natural gas plants to cleaner forms of energy production,
such as solar and wind energy. In 2019, the EPA repealed the CPP, stating
it had exceeded the statutory authority granted to it by Congress.47
C. Chevron Deference
The premise of Chevron deference is that Congress tasks agencies
with administering statutes and “considerable weight should be accorded
to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is
entrusted to adminster.”48 Chevron deference is based on the assumption
that when an agency adminsters an ambiguos statute, Congress intends for
the agency, not the courts, to resolve the ambiguity.49 The premise is that
the agencies have the technical expertise to resolve the ambiguity, unlike
the courts.50 The Chevron doctrine surfaced when the Court noted that if a
“statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.”51 The Court introduced a two-part
test for determining when agency deference should be considered.52 First,
the court must determine whether Congress has spoken on the exact issue
in question by asking whether the statute is ambiguous or silent. 53 If
Congress has not spoken and the statute is either ambigous or silent, the
court must then evaluate whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute
is reasonable.54

44.
West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2603 (2022).
45.
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,667.
46.
Id.
47.
Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse
Gas Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission
Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520, 32,520 (Sept. 06, 2019)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R pt. 60).
48.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
49.
City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296–97 (2013).
50.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 863–66.
51.
Id. at 842–44.
52.
Id. at 843–44.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
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D. Major Questions Doctrine
The major questions doctrine, also known as the major rules
doctrine, departs from typical Chevron deference and allows courts to
question whether Congress intended a delegation of power when an
agency asserts authority over a matter that is of economic or political
significance in a way that deviates from or broadens historically accepted
action.55 In these instances, there must be “more than a merely plausible
textual basis for the agency action.”56 The doctrine stems from the premise
that if Congress intended an agency to have certain authority, it would
explicitly state that and would not mask it in ambigous and vague terms.57
The Court considers the major questions doctrine to be an exception to
Chevron deference.58 This case was the first time that a Supreme Court
opinion explicitly referred to the major questions doctrine.59 Although the
Court has not used the specific term before; the Court has previously used
the approach in several cases.60
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The generation shifting methods were never implemented because
the CPP never took effect.61 After the EPA promulgated the CPP; multiple
petitioners petitioned the D.C. Circuit for a review of the rule.62 The D.C.
Circuit Court refused to grant a stay.63 The petitioners challenged the Circuit Court’s decision, and the Supreme Court granted a stay, pending review of the rule.64 Before the Circuit Court could issue an opinion, the new
presidential administration requested that litigation surrounding the CPP
be temporarily suspended to allow for reconsideration of the plan.65 As a
result, the Circuit Court halted litigation and the petition was dismissed as

55.
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE, IF I
2077 (April 6, 2022).
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
59.
West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2505, 2609 (2022).
60.
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE, IF I
2077; see FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Ala.
Ass’n of Realtors v. HHS, 141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021); Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573
U.S. 302 (2014); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. DOL, OSHA, 142 S. Ct. 661 (2022).
61.
West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2604.
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
West Virginia v. EPA, 577 U.S. 1126 (2016).
65.
West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2604.
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moot.66 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, consolidating North American Coal Cooperative v. EPA, 67 Westmoreland Mining Holdings v.
EPA,68 North Dakota v. EPA,69 and West Virginia v. EPA70 into this case.71
In 2019, the EPA repealed the CPP, stating that in using generation shifting methods to determine the BSER, the EPA had exceeded the
statutory authority granted to it by Congress under the CAA.72 The agency
stated, under the CAA, the use of generation shifting methods in determining the BSER fell under the major questions doctrine and that if Congress
had intended the BSER to be based on generation shifting methods, it
would have made that clear.73 The agency then stated the BSER should
instead be limited to equipment and practice adjustments at a plant level
and not a shift at the grid level.74
After the repeal of the CPP, the EPA replaced the plan with the
ACE rule.75 Under the ACE rule, the EPA determined that the BSER for
existing coal-fired power plants was heat rate improvements.76 The heat
rate improvements would involve both new technology implementation
and operating and maintenance practices at the plant level.77
Unhappy with the ACE rule, several plaintiffs filed for review of
the rule by the D.C. Circuit.78 The Circuit Court consolidated the petitions
into a single case.79 The Circuit Court concluded that the EPA incorrectly
interpreted the statute by not allowing the inclusion of generation shifting
methods for the BSER, and in doing so, the agency had unnecessarily restricted itself.80 The Circuit Court held that the EPA had “misconceived
the law” and determined that the only way to remedy the misconception
was to vacate both the ACE rule and the repeal of the CPP and remand to
the agency.81

66.
Id.
67.
No. 20-1531, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 5333 (Oct. 29, 2021).
68.
No. 20-1778, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 5336 (Oct. 29, 2021).
69.
142 S. Ct. 418 (2021).
70.
142 S. Ct. 420 (2021).
71.
West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 420 (2021).
72.
Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to
Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520, 32,523 (Sept.
06, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R pt. 60).
73.
Id. at 32,529.
74.
Id. at 32,523.
75.
Id. at 32,532.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 985 F.3d 914, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
79.
Id.
80.
Id. at 995.
81.
Id.
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IV. DECISION
The Court addressed the issue of whether the EPA had the authority under the CAA to use generation shifting methods for the BSER of
existing coal-fired power plants.82 The Court held that under the major
questions doctrine, Congress had not clearly given the EPA the authority
to include generation shifting methods in the BSER and because the decision was one of major breadth, clear congressional authority was necessary.83 The Dissent rebutted by saying that Section 111(d) is intended to
be a catch-all provision used to regulate pollutants that do not fall under
NAAQS or HAP regulation. Congress intended the section to provide discretion and flexibility to the EPA.84 The Dissent concluded that the EPA
had the discretion to decide what methods to use when determining the
BSER and that the inclusion of generation shifting did not exceed the
agency’s authority under the statute.85
A. Majority Opinion
The Court first discussed the justiciability of the case, determining
that the petitioners had standing and that the issue was not moot.86 The
Court then turned to the major questions doctrine to evaluate the authority
granted to the EPA under Section 111, holding that the agency has exceeded its authority and generation shifting methods could not be included
in the BSER.87
1.

Justiciability

The federal government argued that the case was not justiciable
because none of the petitioners had Article III standing.88 A party has Article III standing to appeal if the party has been injured by a judgement
below and the injury could be redressed by a favorable ruling from the
appellant court.89 The Court determined that at least one of the petitioners,
specifically the states, had standing.90 The Court explained the decision of
the District Court had vacated the ACE rule and, as a result, had also vacated the repeal of the CPP.91 The CPP required the states to regulate coalfired power plants more stringently.92 Therefore, because the repeal was

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2600 (2022).
Id. at 2616.
Id. at 2629 (Kagan, J., with Breyer and Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2606–07 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2616.
Id. at 2606.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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vacated, the states were injured by the lower court’s decision.93 The government argued that because the EPA had made clear that it had decided
to create a new rule and did not plan on enforcing the CPP, there was no
possibility of injury.94 The Court stated the case was not moot unless it is
clear that the wrong that caused the injury could not possibly occur again.95
The EPA could choose to enforce the CPP since the repeal was vacated.96
A favorable decision by the Supreme Court could redress the injury inflicted on the states, and because of that, the states had standing, and the
case was justiciable.97
2.

EPA Exceeded its Authority Under the CAA

The Court ultimately held that the EPA had exceeded its authority
under the CAA when it determined that generation shifting could be included in the BSER for coal-fired power plants.98 In coming to this conclusion, the Court first looked at the statute itself to determine whether
Congress gave EPA the specific authority, and then evaluated the authority
under the major questions doctrine.99
The Court began its analysis by first employing a fundamental
canon of statutory interpretation.100 The Court read the words of the statute
in their context, keeping in mind their place in the entire statutory
scheme.101 The Court noted that when looking at a statute that an agency
had interpreted, it is important to consider whether Congress intended to
give that authority to the agency.102 The Court then described that the major questions doctrine applies in “cases in which the ‘history and the
breadth of the authority that [the agency] has asserted,’ and the ‘economic
and political significance’ of that assertion, provide a ‘reason to hesitate
before concluding that Congress’ meant to confer such authority.”103 In
these cases, there must be “more than a merely plausible textual basis for
the agency action.”104 The Court supported this doctrine by explaining an
array of cases that relied on the principles of the major questions doctrine.105 The Court explained that large congressional grants of power to

93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
Id. at 2607.
96.
Id.
97.
Id.
98.
Id. at 2615–16.
99.
Id. at 2607–16.
100. Id. at 2607.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2607–08.
103. Id. at 2606 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tabacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000)).
104. Id. at 2609 (quoting Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. FDA, 573 U.S. 302, 324
(2014)).
105. Id. at 2608.
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agencies are not likely done in vague and unapparent ways and that it is
presumed that “Congress intends to make major policy decisions itself.”106
The Court concluded that the major questions doctrine applied in
this case.107 The Court used multiple factors to determine whether Congress intended to give the agency the authority that the agency believed it
had.108 Those factors included the economic and political significance of
the rule, the statute's history and the agency’s past interpretations of the
statute, congressional action on the matter, and the place of the statute in
the statutory scheme.109
The Court looked at the extend of authority the EPA was exercising and whether Congress had intended to give the agency that authority.110 The EPA noted that to regulate carbon dioxide emissions effectively,
it would need to take a broader approach when determining the necessary
regulations.111 The Court held that the broad approach was unprecedented
and a revision of the regulatory scheme from one form to an entirely different one.112 The Court explained that by using generation shifting in the
BSER, the EPA tried to exercise gross power over the American energy
industry and that unless explicitly given that authority by Congress, the
agency did not have the authority to do so.113 The government argued that
because the amount of generation shifting required must be adequately
demonstrated and take into account other factors such as cost, health, and
environmental impacts, the authority is not as extensive as the Court
claimed.114 The Court stated that the government’s argument revealed the
breadth of the authority the agency claimed because the EPA itself stated
that the expertise required to determine the standards when using generation shifting in the BSER is not traditionally the expertise needed for the
EPA, demonstrating that this is likely not something Congress intended
the EPA to do.115
The Court also looked to EPA’s previous use of Section 111. The
Court pointed out that the EPA’s previous uses of Section 111 focused on
requiring plants to operate cleaner and did not mention generation shifting.116 The government argued that the EPA implemented one rule that
relied on a cap-and-trade mechanism, akin to the one at issue here. Still,
the Court stated that the legality of that rule was never addressed and that
that rule was not the same as the one at issue here because in the previous
rule, a plant could comply with the regulation by installing appropriate

106. Id. at 2609 (quoting U.S. Telecom Ass’n. v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 428
U.S. App. D.C. 439 (CADA 2017)).
107. Id. at 2610.
108. Id. at 2607–16.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2610–14.
111. Id. at 2611.
112. Id. at 2612.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2612–13.
116. Id. at 2610.
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controls.117 There are no controls that a coal-fired plant could install that
would allow it to meet the emission limits of the CPP.118 The Court also
made a point to mention that in the inaugural rulemaking under Section
111(d), the EPA itself stated that “Congress intended a technology-based
approach” of emission standards.119
The Court then looked to the statutory scheme of the section. The
Court noted that Section 111(d) is a gap-filler provision used only for pollutants that do not fall under NAAQS or HAP regulation.120 The government argued that generation shifting fits under the definition of the word
“system” and that cap-and-trade schemes have been used as a “system” of
emission reductions in the past.121 The Court disagreed, stating that the
word system is too vague to assume that Congress intended the authority
that the EPA exercised under the CPP.122 The Court also noted that just
because a cap-and-trade system had been used in other provisions does not
mean that it is what was intended by the use of the word system in Section
111.123
Ultimately, the Court held that a nationwide transition from coalfired power plants is not something that Congress gave the EPA the authority to regulate under Section 111(d) and that generation shifting could
not be included in the BSER for existing coal-fired power plants.124 Further, the magnitude of that authority could only come from clear congressional delegation to the agency, which the Court failed to find.125
The Concurrence, written by Justice Gorsuch, agreed that the
question presented in this case fell under the major questions doctrine and
further explained that the doctrine protects the separation of powers and
the belief that Congress should be the only body regulating such impactful
issues or provide clear delegation of such regulation.126
B. Dissenting Opinion
The Dissent stated that Congress gave EPA the authority to regulate coal-fired power plants by including generation shifting in the
BSER.127 The Dissent began its analysis by noting that under Section 111,
Congress tasked the EPA with regulating “stationary sources of any substance that ‘causes or contributes significantly to, air pollution’ and that

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
ing).

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting 40 Fed. Reg. 53343 (1975)).
Id. at 2600–01.
Id. at 2614–15.
Id. at 2615.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2616.
Id. at 2617–19 (Gorsuch, J., with Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2643–44 (Kagan, J., with Breyer and Sotomayor, JJ., dissent-
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‘may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.’”128
The Dissent stated that greenhouse gases fit that description, which means
under Section 111, Congress gave EPA the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power plants.129
Unlike the Majority, the Dissent determined Section 111(d) is not
a gap-filler provision, but instead a catch-all provision because it applies
to all pollutants not covered by the NAAQS or HAP.130 The Dissent noted
that by using the words “best system of emission reduction” in Section
111, Congress intentionally gave the EPA the broad authority to regulate
using its own discretion.131 The Dissent reasoned that Congress creates
broad provisions like Section 111 so agencies can respond to new and
large problems that arise.132 The Dissent determined that the Majority’s
reasoning is based solely on the idea that the system the EPA is proposing
is too new and significant to be regulated in such general terms, but noted
it is not a reason to restrict an agency, an expert in the given area, from
regulating.133
The Dissent thought it was clear that generation shifting fits within
the meaning of BSER because the point of using the word system was for
the possible implementations to be broad.134 The Dissent then looked to
other rules the EPA has implemented under the CAA, noting cap-and-trade
systems had been implemented under other provisions that use the word
system.135 This demonstrated that generation shifting as the BSER was appropriate under the wording of the provision and the CAA.136 The Dissent
next turned to other provisions of the CAA and noted Congress did not
give the EPA as much flexibility when setting emission standards under
other provisions because in other provision, Congress limited the authority
by using the word technology to describe the controls that could be used.137
In Section 111, the technological restraint was purposefully excluded.138
This shows Congress intended the interpretation of this section to be
broader than other sections and include more than just technological controls.139
The Dissent finally addressed the Majority’s application of the
major questions doctrine, stating the doctrine has only been used in instances where an agency was doing something not usually in its expertise
or doing something that would restrict “Congress’s broader design.” 140

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 2627–28 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (2018)).
Id. at 2627 (Kagan, J., with Breyer and Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 2628–29.
Id. at 2628.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2629–30.
Id. at 2631.
Id.
Id. at 2631–32.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2633.
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This case presents neither of those issues.141 Referring to a previous Supreme Court decision, the Dissent noted the Court determined that under
Section 111, Congress had given the EPA the authority to determine
whether and how to regulate carbon dioxide emissions, emphasizing the
word how.142 The Dissent then went on to state every power plant regulation “’dictat[es]’ the national energy mix to one or another degree” and
because of that everything the EPA does could be considered generation
shifting.143 Thus, the Dissent found Section 111(d) gave EPA the authority
to develop the CPP and to use generation shifting as the BSER.144
V. ANALYSIS
A. Justiciability
The Court determined that this case was justiciable.145 This case
centered on the CPP, a plan created by the EPA under the CAA aimed to
reduce the amount of electricity generated by coal from 38% to 27% by
2030 nationally.146 As the Dissent noted, that goal was reached without the
CPP's implementation and before the Supreme Court decided to take this
case. Not only had the goal been met, but the EPA made clear that it was
not planning on enforcing the CPP and was instead creating a new regulation.147 Some felt that this case was the Court making a decision on a hypothetical question and that the case should not have been heard because
the EPA was not enforcing the plan—resulting in no injury to the petitioners.148 Others believed that the Court took this case to make clear to the
EPA that it does not have the authority it tried to exercise in the CPP and
that it cannot read its authority too broadly.149
The Supreme Court cannot and does not grant every petition it
receives for certiorari. It was arguably unnecessary for the Supreme Court
to have granted certiorari for this case—where the plan at issue was nearly
irrelevant—even though it legally could hear the case. The Court not only
granted certiorari, but formally introduced the major questions doctrine.150
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142. Id. at 2636 (citing Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410,
426 (2011)).
143. Id. at 2637–38.
144. Id. at 2643–44.
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(Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
147. West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2607.
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to Address Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2022), https://perma.cc/6WFZM982 (last visited Oct. 28, 2022).
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environmental agenda, WASHINGTON POST (June 30, 2022), https://perma.cc/B9JRWSTV (last visited Oct. 28, 2022).
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The Court could have waited to address the issue until the new rule was
implemented and the potential for injury to petitioners was more apparent.
The Court could have then formally introduced the major questions doctrine instead of prematurely introducing a doctrine that will have such a
significant impact on administrative law—now made precedent by a case
that arguably should not have even been heard.
B. Major Questions Doctrine
In implementing the CPP, the Court claimed that the EPA had
strayed away from its typical interpretation of Section 111.151 The agency
had previously implemented regulations under the section using only technological controls for BSERs, and under the CPP, it had shifted to using
generation shifting methods and technological controls.152 The Court suggested that this case falls under the major questions doctrine because it
presents a substantial economic impact and deviates from the agency's previous interpretations of the section by broadening the interpretation and
considerations for the BSER.153 The EPA is not deviating from its previous
interpretation by including generation shifting in the BSER; it is simply
determining the BSER as directed by Congress. As the Dissent pointed out,
in creating Section 111, Congress explicitly excluded the word technology
when describing the system standards and inserts the word best, allowing
the EPA to use its judgment in determining what the best system would be,
without adding constraints.154
The CPP met the economic significance element of the major
questions doctrine. However, the Court should not have restricted the authority exercised by the EPA because the CPP did not meet the broad newfound power element. The statute and the statutory scheme clearly demonstrated that Congress intended flexibility in the interpretation by the EPA,
the experts in the area.
The proposition that in extraordinary cases there should be pause
when determining whether Congress has given an agency specific authority, particularly when the authority has significant newfound breadth, has
been addressed by the Court in the past.155 In FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corporation156, the Court held that the Food and Drug Administration did not have authority to regulate tobacco products because under
the statutory language of the specific act the FDA would be required to
completely remove tobacco products from the market and Congress had
created separate tobacco specific regulations.157 In Alabama Association
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of Realtors v. HHS158, the Court held that the Center for Disease Control
could not impose an eviction moratorium to prevent the spread of COVID19 because that kind of authority was outside of the authority granted to
the CDC by Congress and would have significant economic impacts.159 In
these cases, as well as other past cases where the Court utilized the major
questions doctrine concept, the agency action was clearly outside of the
scope of the agency’s authority and area of expertise.160 Unlike the CDC
trying to step into landlord-tenant law, the CPP and regulation of greenhouse gases is clearly something that is within the authority of the EPA.
This decision potentially broadens the reach of the major questions doctrine to not only prevent agency regulation of issues outside of the
agency’s authority, but also restrict regulation of issues clearly within the
agency’s expertise.
C. Administrative Impact
The official introduction of the major questions doctrine will
likely result in confusion and potentially less authority for agencies. The
Court has yet to expressly state when congressional delegation meets the
threshold of clear delegation under the major questions doctrine. This
leaves room for confusion because an agency will not know if it has
exceeded the threshold, potentially resulting in agencies not regulating in
ways they should be for fear of being scrutinized under the doctrine.
The doctrine appears to be an exception to the traditional Chevron
deference given to agencies when interpreting a statute that is either silent
or ambiguous.161 The doctrine is invoked when an agency action does not
match historical actions taken by the agency or encompasses a wide
breadth, and has a significant economic or political impact.162 This means
that just because an agency decision has economic or political significance,
the major questions doctrine does not automatically apply. The action has
to meet the significance element and be a novel action by either expanding
or deviating from prior action that the agency has taken under the same
authority.163 This second element will likely provide some insulation for
agencies when acting in ways that have significant economic or political
impacts as long as the agency is acting in a way that it has in the past.
Under Chevron deference, an agency that is given deference under
step two of the Chevron analysis can change their interpretation of the
statute as long as the change is still a reasonable interpretation of the

158. 141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021).
159. Id. at 2488–91.
160. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161
(2000); Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. HHS, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2488–91 (2021); Util. Air
Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 310 (2014); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. DOL,
OSHA, 142 S. Ct. 661, 666–67 (2022).
161. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE SUPREME COURT’S “MAJOR QUESTIONS”
DOCTRINE: BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, LSB10745 (May 17, 2022).
162. West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2607–08 (2022).
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statute.164 It is possible that if an agency were to change its interpretation,
as allowed by Chevron, and create a rule that would meet the significance
element of the major questions doctrine, a court would determine that the
interpretation is subject to the major questions doctrine if the agency is not
acting as it had in the past. It is important to note that the Supreme Court
has recently decided three cases using the major questions doctrine. 165
This suggests that the Court is moving away from agency deference and
exercising more control over statutory interpretation.
This decision could also present issues for Congress in their
delegation of power to agencies. To regulate under the major questions
doctrine, an agency must have clear delegation from Congress.166 It is not
apparent what this means, but it suggests that, at the very least, Congress
will need to be more specific in creating statutes and will not be able to
leave as much up to agency interpretation as it has in the past. This presents
an issue because Congress cannot predict every problem an agency would
need to address, and the doctrine will likely restrict agency authority and
lessen court deference to agencies.
D. Environmental Impact
This decision greatly inhibits the EPA's flexibility and ability to
regulate greenhouse gases effectively. Climate change is a serious problem
that threatens the health of all people and the environment.167 Greenhouse
gas emissions are the most significant contributor to climate change.168
Congress tasked the EPA with administering the CAA.169 Congress created Section 111(d) of the CAA to regulate the pollutants that were not
covered under NAAQS or HAP.170 Not only did Congress create Section
111(d) as a catch-all provision, but it also broadened the standards by excluding the technology restraint.171 This indicates that Congress intended
Section 111 to be a broad statute to allow for agency interpretation and
flexibility when determining the BSER. This decision not only restricts
EPA’s ability to regulate greenhouse gases, but also restricts EPA’s ability
to regulate generally.
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It is important to note that the Court did not rule that all greenhouse gas emissions are outside of the authority of the EPA.172 Greenhouse
gases are also regulated in other sections of the CAA.173 Thus, all hope is
not lost for greenhouse gas emission regulation. Nevertheless, this decision makes regulation much more difficult for the EPA because it requires
that Congress clearly grants authority when regulating greenhouse gases
in certain instances.174 The EPA—not Congress—is the expert on climate
change regulation and should be able to regulate as it deems necessary
without requiring explicit direction from Congress when making decisions
using its expertise with authority already granted to it.
VI. CONCLUSION
Climate change is causing the earth to deteriorate at an alarming
rate. Greenhouse gas emissions are one of the leading causes of climate
change.176 The EPA must be able to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
from coal-fired power plants in the way it sees fit and should not have to
rely solely on technological implementations.
Even though the case was justiciable, the Supreme Court should
not have taken the case. Although the issue was not moot, it was not pressing and would not have come up in the future since the EPA stated it would
not enforce the CPP.
The clear statutory language of Section 111 gave the EPA the authority to determine the BSER. Nowhere in the section does the language
suggest regulation was restrained, let alone by technological restraints that
would be ineffective in reaching the desired result.
This case will have significant implications on administrative law,
particularly regarding agency deference. Chevron deference will likely be
used more narrowly in the future, given that the Court has begun to frequently use the major questions doctrine and seems to be steering away
from agency deference. The major questions doctrine will restrict agency
authority because the agencies will have to rely on explicit congressional
delegation when creating certain impactful regulations and will not be
given the deference allowed to them in the past. This doctrine will also
burden Congress when delegating authority because Congress can no
longer defer to agency expertise and instead must provide unrealistically
clear intent.
175
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This case inhibits the EPA’s ability to protect the environment by
properly regulating greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power
plants. The EPA—not the Court—is the expert on environmental regulation, but this decision improperly removes important authority that Congress granted to the experts.

